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 How Conflict Within the House Impacts a Military 
Spouse: An Evaluation of Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a “Marital” Asset 
Anthony Cox Jr, Esq.* 
I. Introduction 
Imagine Hilary Joe marrying Donald Doe. Later, both individuals 
later realize the marriage is not in their best interest.  As a result, the parties 
decide a divorce is proper and need the court’s guidance in determining 
the fate of each party’s respective assets. A common sub-issue that arises 
from this type of scenario is the issue of which assets the courts will 
consider as marital assets, for divorce purpose? 
Now imagine that Hilary is a military spouse that began receiving 
Combat-Related Special Compensation1 prior to the divorce. Combat-
Related Special Compensation is a unique form of monetary compensation 
that is reserved for military individuals that are injured in combat.2 
Concisely, it is a statutory benefit that compensates military veterans who 
suffered from combat- related injuries.3  How does adding Combat-
Related Special Compensation into the mix impact the division of property 
phase of Hilary and Donald’s divorce? In fact, this makes the division of 
marital property phase of their divorce much more complex because 
courts, and particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, have yet to set any precedent regarding the issue of whether 
Combat-Related Special Compensation should be considered a marital 
asset in the divorce context. 
Should Combat-Related Special Compensation be considered a 
marital asset in the equitable distribution context? In short, the answer is 
yes, based on existing Third Circuit precedent. Part I of this Comment will 
shed light for both the Third Circuit and military couples across the 
country. Part II will highlight the Third Circuit’s approach to equitable 
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1See 10 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2016). 
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distribution. Part III will evaluate some of the Third Circuit’s precedent of 
its evaluation of some of the most common controversial marital assets. 
Part IV will provide some background on Combat-Related Special 
Compensation. Part V will evaluate Combat-Related Special 
Compensation in the equitable distribution context. Part VI will propose a 
solution to the Third Circuit regarding this issue, and Part VII will provide 
some final thoughts and address how this issue will impact Third Circuit 
divorce law moving forward. 
A. BACKGROUND ON DIVORCE 
 Recent studies reveal that divorce rates are consistently 
increasing, particularly amongst couples over fifty years old.4 When a 
couple agrees to marry, although the marriage is intended to last “till death 
do us part,”5 this is statistically not always the case. In fact, over the past 
twenty years, the divorce rate amongst couples over fifty-years old 
commonly referred to as “gray divorces,”6 has doubled.7 As many 
individuals who receive Combat-Related Special Compensation are 
around fifty-years of age,8 this “gray divorce” statistic is critical for the 
issue at hand. There needs to be critical background information with 
respect to evaluating this issue. 
It is important to be aware of some common scenarios that result in 
a “gray divorce” because gray divorces are those that are likely to result in 
a dispute over Combat-Related Special Compensation. These scenarios 
include: an emotional disconnection between the couple, the couples’ 
children moving out of the household, a desire to pursue self-fulfillment, 
changes in financial circumstances, and adultery.9 
Now that a foundation has been set as to divorce, assume that the 
reason Hilary and Donald have decided to get a divorce is because the two 
recently experienced an emotional disconnect in their relationship. 
Legally, what is the next step for both Hilary and Donald?  Generally 
speaking, both parties would seek some form of alternative dispute 
resolution in order to evaluate their decision to divorce and any related 
                                                                                                         
4Arlene G. Dubin & Rebecca A. Provder, The Gray Divorce Phenomenon, NEW YORK LAW 
JOURNAL, July 25, 2016. 
5 Id. 
6The term “gray divorce” is a term commonly used in the family law context to refer to a 
divorce that consists of a couple where both parties are above fifty-years old. The term was 
created to correspond with the fact that it is common for men and woman above fifty years 
of age to develop gray hair. Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 DUBIN & PROVDER, supra note 4. 
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legal issues.10 Mediation is the most common method of alternative 
dispute resolution.11 This is the preferred method in divorce proceedings 
because its relaxed environment and process compliments the emotional 
aspect of divorce proceedings.12 Historically speaking, divorce 
proceedings were handled in court.  However, this changed over time, as 
parties were not satisfied with the “win-lose” atmosphere that occurs in 
traditional court proceedings.13 
Divorce mediations consist of a third party, typically a licensed 
family law practitioner,14 who serves as a moderator for the parties 
involved in the dispute. While the third party does not have any impact on 
the result of the dispute, he or she strives to counsel both parties to reach 
a decision that is favorable to their needs and goals.15 There are five 
common mediation models that mediators exercise: the facilitative model, 
the transformative model, the evaluative model, the technique of reality 
testing model, and the eleventh-hour divorce facilitation model.16 
i.  Facilitative Model 
The first method that mediators use in divorce disputes is the 
facilitative model.17 The goal of the facilitative model is to create an 
environment that enables the parties to reach a mutually agreeable 
decision.18 Under the facilitative model, the mediator requires the parties 
to brainstorm and analyze potential solutions to their problems 
collaboratively. 
ii. Transformative Model 
The second method that mediators use in divorce disputes is the 
transformative model. The goal of the transformative model is to enable 
the parties to “recognize the interests, needs, and values of the other 
party.”19 Specifically, the goal is to transform the relationship to a point 
                                                                                                         
10Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial 
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241 (2008). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13Id. at 245. 
14Divorce lawyers are the only individuals allowed to serve as the neutral party in divorce 
mediation because they are best equipped to deal with the emotional aspect. Id. at 242. 
15Id. at 244. 
16Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial 
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241, 246 (2008). 
17Id. at 247. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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where the parties can recognize the needs of the other and understand each 
other more fluently.20 
iii. Evaluative Model 
The third method utilized by mediators in divorce disputes is the 
evaluative model.21 This model is most parallels to traditional litigation, 
as it is the model where the mediator takes the most active role.22 The 
unique thing about the evaluative model is unlike the first two models; it 
requires the mediator to provide each party with their individual analysis 
and advice on the respective issues surrounding the divorce.23 The goal of 
this method is to give the parties with a snippet of  how a trial judge would 
decide their respective legal issues24 Specifically, this method strives to 
have the parties focus to find a mutually favorable decision, knowing that 
a trial judge may issue an unfavorable decision for one of the parties.25 
iv. Technique of Reality Testing Model 
The fourth method used by mediators in divorce disputes is the 
technique of reality testing model. This method is very popular; it is 
generally exercised when the parties are having an issue in reaching a 
solution.26 This method consists of the mediator openly informing the 
parties of how a court is likely to decide on their differences.27 This is 
commonly referred to as the “wake-up call” method, as it strives to force 
the parties to face reality.28 
v. Eleventh Hour Divorce Facilitation Model 
The fifth method used by mediators is the eleventh-hour divorce 
facilitation model.29 This method is unique because unlike the other four 
methods that are used at the beginning of the dispute; this method is not 
used until the trial date begins approaching.30 The goal of this method is 
not to prevent a trial; instead, it strives to provide parties with a different 
                                                                                                         
20 Id. 
21Id. at 248. 
22Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial 
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241,248 (2008). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27Id. at 249. 
28Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial 
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241, 249 (2008). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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perspective to increase the probability of the parties reaching a mutual 
decision at or before trial.31 
B. LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM DIVORCE 
Now that Hilary and Donald have chosen a method for mediation, it 
is important to evaluate some of the potential legal issues that may arise 
for the couple. The most common issues that arise from divorce include 
child custody, child support, and the division of the marital property.32 
i. Child Custody 
Assuming Hilary and Donald have children at the time they decide 
to divorce, they will face child custody issues. In assessing this issue, 
courts attempt to make a custody decision that is in the best interest of the 
children.33 With the best interest of the children being the primary 
influence on a courts’ decision regarding custody issues, there are four 
types of custody awards that courts can grant.34 Those four types of 
custody include the following: sole custody, joint custody, divided 
custody, and split custody.35 A court can award either sole legal custody 
or sole physical custody. 36 If a court awards sole legal custody, the 
custodial parent37 maintains the legal rights regarding the children.38 On 
the other hand, in a sole physical custody situation, the non-custodial 
parent39 maintains limited rights and access to the children.40 If a court 
awards sole physical custody, then the custodial parent maintains primary 
custody of the child, while the non-custodial parent is generally only 
entitled to visitation.41 
Courts can award joint legal custody or joint physical custody.42 If a 
court awards joint legal custody both parents retain the right to make 
                                                                                                         
31 Id. 
32DUBIN & PROVDER, supra note 4. 
33Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 1988, at 
123. 
34Id. at 124. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37The custodial parent is the parent who is given physical custody by a court order or the 
parent that the child is physically with for a majority of the time. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
38JOAN B. KELLY, supra note 33. 
39The non-custodial parent is the parent who does not have physical custody or the parent 
that the child is not physically with for a majority of the time. BLACK’S LAW, supra note 
37. 
40JOAN B. KELLY, supra note 33. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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decisions regarding the health and welfare of the children.43 In contrast, if 
a court awards joint physical custody, the right to exercise residential care 
is granted to both parents. The day-to-day schedule for the child is left to 
the discretion of the parents. 44 The final two common types of custody are 
divided custody and split custody.45  For divided custody, each parent 
maintains equal legal rights and will alternate physical custody.46 Split 
custody gives each parent both sole legal and physical custody, it 
continues to be the most popular type of custody.47 This is because courts 
generally find joint custody to be in the best interest of the child to have 
equal access to both parents.48 
ii. Child Support 
Child support is another issue that will likely challenge Hilary and 
Donald.  Traditionally, child support has been defined as “cash 
contributions made on behalf of a minor child pursuant to a court order or 
an agreement between the parents.”49 Before a court can award child 
support, it is important that one prerequisite is established.50 Specifically, 
the party requesting child support has the burden of demonstrating that the 
opposing party is the biological parent of the child or has a relationship 
with the child to the extent where granting child support would be 
justified.51 Assuming that the party requesting child support can meet this 
prerequisite, the court will assess general child support guidelines to 
determine the amount of child support it will award.52 Income is the 
primary factor that courts use to consider the amount of child support that 
it will award.53 As a result, the amount of child support that either Hilary 
or Donald would be entitled to would hinge upon the court’s income 
analysis.54 
                                                                                                         
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 1988, at 
124. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49Establishment of Child Support Obligations, Essentials for Attorneys in Children. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54A child support income analysis requires courts to evaluate a spouse’s net income and 
the number of children involved. While the percentage of child support generally does 
not change, it is scaled based on the spouse’s net income and the number of children 
involved. Jane Venohr, Review of the Pennsylvania Child Support Guidelines, 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, March 30, 2012. 
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iii. Division of Marital Property 
Now it is time for Hilary and Donald to decide what legally will 
happen to the couples’ property. This issue will depend upon the approach 
that Donald and Hilary’s jurisdiction follows regarding the division of 
marital property. 
C. APPROACHES USED TO DIVIDE MARITAL ISSUES 
There are three distinct approaches governing this issue: Community 
Property, Separate Property, and Equitable Distribution.55 For the sake of 
brevity, this Comment will only discuss Community Property and 
Equitable Distribution, as these are the only approaches employed by the 
Third Circuit.56 
i. Community Property Approach 
The first approach that is used to address this issue is the Community 
Property Approach.57 The majority of the Community Property states are 
west coast states including Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.58 In a community property 
jurisdiction, spouses have an equal interest in all income and assets that 
are acquired during the marriage.59 In reference to any property that is 
acquired prior to the marriage, each party only maintains an interest in its 
respective income and assets.60 Therefore, if Hilary and Donald divorce in 
a community property state, whether Hilary’s Combat Special Relation 
Compensation would be a marital asset at the time of marriage would 
hinge upon whether Hilary acquired rights to Combat Related Special 
Compensation prior to or during the marriage. 
ii. Equitable Distribution Approach 
The next approach used in distributing marital property is the 
equitable distribution approach.61 Equitable distribution jurisdictions view 
marriage as a partnership. Therefore, the primary goal of equitable 
distribution is to divide the property justly and fairly, while distributing 
the property without regard to the party that holds legal title to the piece 
                                                                                                         
55Benjamin Ellis, Protecting the Right to Marital Property, CARDOZA L. REV. 30:4 (2009). 
56 Id. 
57James R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions: 
Equitable Doesn’t Equal, 72 LA. L. REV. 21. 
58Id.at 21 n.1 
59Id. at 22. 
60 Id. 
61Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 481. 
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of property or asset.62 Equitable distribution focuses on distributing the 
property in a manner that creates the most just and fair result.63 This is why 
unlike the other approaches; the equitable distribution approach 
recognizes both a party’s economic and noneconomic contributions, in 
order to ensure a fair result.64 While the analysis regarding equitable 
distribution is state specific and governed by statutory law, each state’s 
law strives to achieve the same goals described above.65 For purposes of 
this Comment, assume that Hilary and Donald are residents of any Third 
Circuit jurisdiction, other than the Virgin Islands. Therefore, equitable 
distribution law will govern whether Hilary’s Combat Related Special 
Compensation should be considered a marital asset with respect to Donald 
and Hilary’s divorce. 
 
II. The Third Circuit’s Approach: Relevant Law 
As the Third Circuit is made up of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New 
Jersey, and the Virgin Islands,66 this section will address each of these 
respective laws regarding the process of dividing marital property. The 
Virgin Island’s law will not be discussed in detail, as it is the only Third 
Circuit territory and is not an equitable distribution jurisdiction. 
A. PENNSYLVANIA 
In Pennsylvania, the Section 3501 four-step analysis governs this 
issue.67 First, Pennsylvania courts determine whether the asset in dispute 
is to be considered property.68 Second, if the asset is considered to be 
property, the courts then consider if the asset is “marital” property 
pursuant to Section 3501.69 Third, the court will value the asset. Finally, 
the courts will divide the asset.70 
The first step of the analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine 
whether the asset involved is property, which is governed by the basic 
principles Pennsylvania property law.71 Concerning real property, this step 
of the analysis is presumed.72 On the other hand, Pennsylvania has not set 
                                                                                                         
62Id. at *2. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66THIRD CIRCUIT COURTS, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/third-circuit-courts. 
6723 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3501(a). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72Id. at (b). 
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a bright-line rule for intangible property. Pennsylvania’s analysis 
regarding some of the most controversial intangible property will be 
discussed in a later section. 
If the court determines that there is property involved in the divorce, 
then the next step is determining if the asset is “marital” property. 
Subsection (a) of Section 3501 governs this issue. Pursuant to subsection 
(a), marital property consists of all property acquired by either party during 
the marriage and any increases in the value of all other property during 
marriage.73 On the other hand, marital property does not consist of the 
following: 
[P]roperty acquired prior to marriage or property acquired in 
exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage; property 
excluded by valid agreement of the parties into before, during or 
after marriage; property acquired by gift;74property acquired after 
final separation until the date of divorce, except for property 
acquired in exchange for marital assets; property which a party has 
sold, granted, conveyed or otherwise disposed of in good faith and 
for value prior to the date of final separation, veteran’s benefits 
exempt from attachment, levy or seizure pursuant to act of 
September 2, 1958; property to the extent to which the property 
has been mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in good faith for 
value prior to the date of final separation; and any payment 
received as a result of an award or settlement for any cause of 
action or claim which accrued prior to the marriage or after the 
date of final separation regardless of when the payment was 
received.75 
Because statutory law governs this section, Pennsylvania courts rely solely 
on the statute in determining if the asset at issue is marital property. 
If a Pennsylvania court finds an asset as marital pursuant to Section 
3501, it then proceeds to the next step of the analysis; valuing the property. 
In determining the value of a marital asset, Pennsylvania courts uses the 
present division approach.76 According to the present division approach, 
the determination as to the value is made at the time of trial.77 The courts 
rely on valuation experts to provide an expert opinion as to the value of 
the asset in dispute at the time of trial.78 Although the final decision 
                                                                                                         
73Id. at (a). 
74It is important to note that this excludes property acquired by bequest, devise, descent, or 
property acquired in exchange for such property. See 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3501(a)(3). 
75Id. at  (a)(1)-(4). 
7622 P.L.E. Divorce § 212 (2017). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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regarding value is at the court’s discretion, courts commonly give great 
deference to valuation experts.79 
The final step of the analysis requires the court to divide the property; 
section 3502 governs this issue.80  Section 3502 provides the court with a 
plethora of factors to utilize when analyzing the proper manner to divide 
the property.81 While each factor assesses something slightly different, 
they all evaluate each party’s economic and non-economic contribution to 
the marriage.82 Contribution, both economic and non-economic, is an 
essential principle used by Pennsylvania family law courts when 
determining exactly how to divide the property. 
B. DELAWARE 
Regarding Delaware’s approach to dividing marital property, uses 
Section 1513.83 Like Pennsylvania, Delaware’s governing statute details a 
four-step process. 
First, Delaware courts begin by determining if the asset is considered 
property in the divorce context.84 Unlike Pennsylvania, Delaware does not 
provide much guidance as to which assets should be considered property, 
giving complete deference to the plain language of the statute.85  As a 
result, Delaware courts theoretically begin with the second step of the 
analysis, which is to determine if the asset at issue is a marital asset.86 
Pursuant to Section 1513, marital property includes both property acquired 
by either party subsequent to the marriage87 and all property that is jointly 
titled real property88 acquired prior to the marriage.89 
                                                                                                         
79 Id. 
8023 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3502 (2016). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (2016). 
84 Id. 
85DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (2016). 
86 Id. 
87It is important to know that there are four exceptions to this general rule. Those four 
exceptions include the following: (1) Property acquired by an individual spouse by 
bequest, devise, or descent or by gift, except gifts between spouses, provided the gifted 
property is titled and maintained in the sole name of the done spouse, or a gift tax return 
is filed reporting the transfer of the gifted property in the sole name of the done spouse or 
a notarized document, executed before or contemporaneously with the transfer, is offered 
to demonstrate the nature of the transfer; (2) Property acquired in exchange for property 
acquired prior to the marriage; (3) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; 
(4)   The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage. 
88In this context, jointly titled property includes joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and 
any other form of co-ownership. 
89DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (2016). 
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Assuming the asset at issue meets the statutory definition of “marital 
property,” the courts proceed to determine how the property should be 
valued. In Sayer v. Sayer, a case from the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
Justice Moore provides some insight as to how Delaware courts value 
marital assets.90 According to Sayer, Delaware courts use the present value 
of the asset in dispute.91 The court assigns a monetary value to each asset 
in dispute, sometimes relying on testimony from financial professionals.92 
The final step of the analysis is the actual division of the asset(s). 
Subsection (a) of Section 1513 governs this segment of the analysis.93 
Subsection (a) details eleven factors for courts to evaluate in determining 
exactly how to divide the assets involved. Those factors include the 
following: 
(1) [t]he length of the marriage; (2) Any prior marriage of the 
party; (3) [t]he age, health, station, amount and sources of income, 
(4)vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of 
each of the parties; (5) [w]hether the property award is in lieu of 
or in addition to alimony; (6) [t]he opportunity of each for future 
acquisitions of capital assets and income; (7) [t]he contribution or 
dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, 
depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the 
contribution of a party as homemaker, husband, or wife; (8) [t]he 
value of the property set apart to each party; (9) [t]he economic 
circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is 
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the 
family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to 
the party with whom any children of the marriage will live; (10) 
[w]hether the property was acquired by gift, except those gifts 
excluded by paragraph (b)(1) of this section; (11) [t]he debts of the 
parties; and [t]ax consequences.94 
Delaware courts weigh these factors to determine the proper method of 
division. 
C. NEW JERSEY 
New Jersey assesses equitable distribution claims liberally, 
evidenced by N.J. Stat. § 2A:34-31.1.95 Pursuant to the statute, New Jersey 
relies solely on sixteen factors in determining how to divide the property.96 
                                                                                                         
90Sayer v. Sayer, 492 A.2d 238 (Del. 1985). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (2016). 
94 Id. 
95N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:34-23.1 (2016). 
96 Id. 
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Although the substance of each factor differs, a common theme is that each 
factor assesses each party’s economic and non-economic contribution to 
the asset in dispute. As a result, it is evident that this is the primary focus 
of New Jersey courts is each party’s contribution to the asset at issue.97 
D. VIRGIN ISLANDS 
Unlike the other three jurisdictions in the Third Circuit, the Virgin 
Islands are the only jurisdiction that do not utilize the equitable distribution 
approach. The Virgin Islands exercises a community property approach. 
This Comment will not detail the community property approach, as this 
approach was discussed earlier. 
 
III. The Third’s Circuit’s Approach: Controversial 
“Marital” Assets 
This section of the Comment will evaluate some of the more 
controversial assets, similar to Combat-Related Special Compensation and 
determine whether each Third Circuit jurisdiction, excluding the Virgin 
Islands, considers it to be a marital asset in the divorce context. The section 
evaluates pensions, disability, and military retirement pay. 
A. PENSIONS 
A pension is a type of retirement plan.98 In particular, a pension is a 
fund managed by an employer that is awarded to an employee at the time 
of his or her retirement under circumstances when the employee meets the 
necessary length of employment requirements needed to obtain a 
pension.99 There are two categories of pensions: vested and unvested 
pensions.100 A vested pension is when employee is currently entitled to at 
the time of divorce, an  unvested pension is a pension that an employee is 
not currently entitled to at the time of divorce.101 
i. Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania, it is well-established law that a pension, whether 
vested or unvested, is a marital asset in a divorce.102 In Braderman v. 
Braderman, a case from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Judge 
                                                                                                         
97 Id. 
982-23 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 23.02 (2015). 
99 Id. 
100Id. 
101Id. 
102Flynn v. Flynn, 341 Pa. Super. 76, 491 A.2d 156 (1985). 
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Monttemuro addressed this issue in greater detail.103 Braderman involved 
a husband and wife who decided to divorce. The court had to decide 
whether the husband’s pension.104 In assessing this issue, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania relied on case law from other jurisdictions,105 which 
had not been addressed in Pennsylvania prior to Braderman.106 
Specifically, the Braderman court relied on case law from one of its sister 
circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.107 In 
ruling that a pension is always a marital asset at the time of marriage, the 
Seventh Circuit relied on its precedent that retirement benefits are marital 
assets because of the non-economic contribution that goes into assisting a 
spouse secure retirement benefits.108 The Braderman court adopted this 
rationale; therefore holding that the husband’s pension, and pensions in 
general, are marital assets in divorce disputes.109 Post Braderman, it is 
evident that pensions are marital assets in the state of Pennsylvania. 
ii. Delaware 
In Delaware, a pension is a marital asset in divorce disputes. 110 In 
Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a 
pension that vests during the marriage is a marital asset in a divorce, 
primarily because holding on the contrary would be inconsistent with the 
basic principles of the equitable distribution doctrine.111 Precisely, one of 
the primary purposes of the equitable distribution is to divide the properly 
fairly.112 As a result, the Robert court held that it would be fundamentally 
unfair to not entitle a non-employee spouse to a pension that vested, while 
the parties were married.113 
The issue of whether an unvested pension is a marital asset in the 
divorce context, the Robert court relied on California case law in reaching 
its decision.114 The Supreme Court of California held in In re Marriage of 
Brown that an unvested pension is deemed a marital asset.115 The Brown 
court provided that since a pension is a form of property and a right to 
property is contractual, a non-employee spouse obtains rights to unvested 
                                                                                                         
103Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa. Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985). 
104Id. 
105Id. at 619. 
106Id. 
107Id. 
108Id. (citing 442 N.E. 2d 556). 
109Id. 
110Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383 (Del. 1981). 
111Id. at 386. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
115In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976). 
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pensions when entering into a marital contract with an employee spouse.116 
Despite California being a community property state, the Robert court 
adopted the holding and rationale derived from Brown.117 Currently, it is 
undisputed that both vested and unvested pensions are marital assets in the 
state of Delaware.118 
iii. New Jersey 
In New Jersey, “a pension that is legally or beneficially acquired 
during the marriage is subject to equitable distribution.”119 The Superior 
Court of New Jersey in Sternesky v. Salice-Sternesky addressed this 
issue.120 The Sternesk  Court focused its analysis on the contribution that 
a non-employee spouse makes to an employee spouse obtaining a 
pension.121 The court held that “[b]ecause both spouses contribute to the 
earning of pension, both justifiably expect to share the future enjoyment 
of the pension benefit.”122 As a result, all of the contribution made to 
pensions in New Jersey, the court deemed a pension a marital asset.123 
B. DISABILITY INCOME 
It is not uncommon for a spouse to be entitled to disability income. 
Disability income serves three primary purposes. 124 First, disability 
income tends to compensate for the loss of earnings resulting from 
compelled premature retirement and from a diminished ability to compete 
in the employment market.125 Second, disability income strives to 
compensate the disabled person for suffering caused by the disability. 
Finally, disability income intends to replace a retirement pension by 
providing support for the disabled worker after he leaves his job.126 
i. Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania, whether a disability is a marital asset in the divorce 
hinges upon when the right to receive disability payment arises.127 Judge 
Bender of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania shed light on this issue in 
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Yuhas v. Yuhas.128  Yuhas involved a wife who was asserting that her 
husband’s disability income policy was a marital asset pursuant to 
Pennsylvania case law.129  Prior to the parties’ agreeing to separate, the 
husband suffered a traumatic injury resulting in disability income.130 The 
court held that this issue hinged upon whether the husband’s right to seek 
compensation of the disability income accrued during the marriage.131 
Relying on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Drake v. 
Drake,132 the Yuhas court held that assessing this issue requires the 
determination of when the husband obtained a legal right to the disability 
income.133 In applying this standard to its specific case, the court denied 
the wife’s request, ultimately holding that the husband’s disability is not 
to be considered a marital asset because he did not obtain a legal right to 
the disability income until subsequent the marriage.134 Yuhas makes it 
clear that disability income remains a controversial “marital” asset in 
Pennsylvania. It does set a clear standard to utilize in an equitable 
distribution analysis in determining if a spouse’s disability in dispute is to 
be considered a marital asset.135 
ii. Delaware 
While Delaware has yet to adopt a clear rule on this issue, the Family 
Court of Delaware made it clear that it will decide this issue on a case-by-
case basis.136 The court specified that it would base its holding, when 
disability income is in dispute, on the amount of contribution both 
economic and non-economic contribution, which the party asserting 
disability income as a marital asset can demonstrate. 137Armstrong v. 
Armstrong, a 1994 case from the Delaware Family court, illustrates as to 
how Delaware courts approach this issue. Armstrong involved a wife that 
was diagnosed with Lupus Erythematosus.138 
In Armstrong, the wife began receiving disability income. At this 
time, the husband asserted that he agreed to become a “house husband,” 
and take care of all of the household duties, while the wife handled all of 
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the financial burdens using her disability income.139 Subsequently, the 
parties decided to divorce and a dispute arose as to whether the wife’s 
disability income should be considered a marital asset within the 
marriage.140 The court’s analysis hinged upon the husband’s contribution 
to the wife receiving her disability income.141 The court held that the 
husband did not contribute at all, as he did not become a “house husband” 
until after the wife received her disability income.142 While this case does 
not set a bright-line rule for the state of Delaware, it does specify that 
Delaware courts base its analysis, in evaluating the eligibility of disability 
income in the equitable distribution context, on the amount of contribution 
by the party not compensated by the disability income.143 
iii. New Jersey 
New Jersey takes an interesting approach regarding this issue. It is 
unique that New Jersey courts focus its analysis on the amount of the 
disability income that is eligible for division rather than whether disability 
income itself is eligible.144 The Superior Court of New Jersey illustrates as 
to how New Jersey courts evaluate this issue in Avallone v. Avallone.145 
Avallone, involved a wife claiming that she was entitled to her husband’s 
disability income in the equitable distribution segment of their divorce 
dispute.146 While the husband contended that this issue should hinge upon 
the age of the disability income, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
disagreed.147 The court held that this approach is inconsistent with the 
fundamental principle of fairness that underlies the doctrine of equitable 
distribution.148 Furthermore, the court held that disability income could 
serve as a significant joint financial asset within a marriage.149 The court 
ultimately held that while it will always consider disability income as a 
marital asset in equitable distribution disputes, it would evaluate the 
economic and non-economic contribution made by the party asserting its 
right to entitlement to determine the amount that is eligible for division.150 
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C. MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY 
Military retirement pay is a common asset involved in a divorce 
dispute. Military retirement pay is a federal benefit available to members 
of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Coast Guard.151 To 
become eligible for military retirement pay, an individual must remain on 
active duty or serve in the reserves for the aforementioned military 
branches for a minimum of twenty years. 152 
i. Pennsylvania 
Pursuant to Pennsylvania jurisprudence, military retirement pay is a 
marital asset in the divorce context.153 In Wagner v. Wagner, a case from 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Justice Cappy held that military 
retirement pay is a marital asset in Pennsylvania, so long as the military 
spouse is subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.154 The court relied on the 
language of Section 1408(c)(4) of the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses’ Protection Act.155 Although this generally would be an issue 
governed by federal law, pursuant to Section 1408: 
A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of a member in 
the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has 
jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other 
than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court.156 
As the Wagner court relied on the plain language of Section 1408 in 
determining if military retirement pay is a marital asset in the divorce 
context, its analysis hinged upon whether the husband, the military spouse, 
was subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.157 In fact, post-Wagner this 
issue hinges solely upon whether a military spouse is subject to jurisdiction 
in a state hearing the marital dispute. 
ii. Delaware 
Under Delaware law, military retirement pay is a marital asset in the 
divorce context.158 Delaware adopted an analysis parallel to Pennsylvania, 
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holding that the plain language of Section 1408 gives state family law 
courts the discretion to consider military retirement pay as a marital 
asset.159 
iii. New Jersey 
New Jersey courts consider military retirement pay analogous to a 
pension, therefore holding it as a marital asset in the divorce context.160 
Specifically, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Kruger v. Kruger, 
addressed the question of whether military retirement pay is a marital asset 
in the equitable distribution context.161 Kruger involved a husband and 
wife that decided to divorce as a result of a marital disconnect.162 At the 
equitable distribution stage of the divorce, the wife asserted that she was 
entitled to her husband’s military retirement pay.163 The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that the wife was entitled to her husband’s military 
retirement pay.164 The court rationed that when a military spouse receives 
military retirement pay, it hinges upon the number of years he or she 
engaged in service, it should be treated analogously to a pension.165 As a 
result, the court applied its precedent regarding pensions and set a concrete 
rule with respect to the eligibility of military retirement pay.166 
 
IV. Combat-Related Special Compensation 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In December of 2002, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. § 1413(a), the 
statute governing Combat-Related Special Compensation.167 Congress 
created a form of special compensation to mitigate the loss of income that 
military individuals who suffer disabilities might experience.168 Before the 
enactment of this statute, there was a prohibition against concurrent receipt 
of disability from both the Department of Defense and the Veteran Affairs, 
the two organizations responsible for providing the majority of military 
disability compensation.169 Particularly Congress did not want military 
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individuals to be eligible for “duplicate” benefits, as a result of one 
disability.170 In 2002, however, Congress created this concept of Combat-
Related Special Compensation to make up for some of this loss of 
income.171 
B. DISSECTING COMBAT-RELATED SPECIAL COMPENSATION 
Section 1413(c) governs the eligibility requirements for receiving 
Combat Related Special Compensation benefits.172 Under the statute, a 
military individual is eligible for these benefits if (1) they are entitled to 
retired pay by law and (2) has a combat-related special disability.173 
Concerning the first requirement, a military individual is eligible for 
retired pay when they have at least twenty years of service in their 
respective branch. Section 1413(e) provides some insight on the second 
requirement. 174According to this section, a combat-related disability 
includes those disabilities that are attributable to an injury for which the 
member was awarded a Purple Heart.175 Also, it refers to disabilities that 
occur: as a direct result of armed conflict; while engaged in hazardous 
service; in the performance of duty under conditions simulating war; or 
through an instrumentality of war.176 It is important to note, however, that 
in 2008 Congress expanded the scope of eligibility to now include those 
individuals who have retired for disability, resulting in the inclusion of all 
individuals who were retired from military service regardless of the 
number of years the individual served prior to retirement.177 
Now let’s assume that Hilary, a military spouse, has been deemed 
eligible for Combat- Related Special Compensation and begins to receive 
it. As she and Donald are now at the equitable distribution stage of the 
divorce, it is time for the two to decide which assets, including Hilary’s 
Combat-Related Special Compensation, are eligible to divide. Should 
Hilary’s Combat-Related Special Compensation be eligible? In short, the 
answer is yes pursuant to the relevant Third Circuit precedent. 
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V. An Evaluation of Combat-Related Special 
Compensation in Relation to other Controversial 
Assets 
The Third Circuit has yet to decide whether Combat-Related Special 
Compensation should be considered a marital asset. When they do, 
however, there will be many issues to consider. It will be important for the 
Third Circuit to evaluate the three most important problems that its 
precedent indicates are most important when deciding which assets are 
marital. First, courts must consider the nature of Combat-Related Special 
Compensation about some of the other controversial intangible marital 
assets. Second, courts must consider the nature of non-economic 
contribution that a non-military spouse dedicates to a military spouse. 
Finally, courts must consider basic principles of fundamental fairness. In 
assessing these three factors, it is evident that there are compelling 
arguments both for and against deeming Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a marital asset and the contrary. 
A. ACCEPTING COMBAT-RELATED SPECIAL COMPENSATION AS A 
MARITAL ASSET 
The first compelling argument is recognition of the similarities 
between Combat-Related Special Compensation and some of the other 
common assets such as pensions, disability income, and military 
retirement pay. First, like both pensions and military retirement pay, 
eligibility for Combat-Related Special Compensation hinges at least 
partially on the length of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
in Kruger illustrates the role that similarities in eligibility requirements 
play in this analysis when it made its decision to deem military retirement 
pay a marital asset solely because of how its eligibility requirements 
compared to those of a pension.178  The Kruger court held that military 
retirement pay should be treated consistent with pensions because like a 
pension, eligibility of military retirement pay hinges upon length of 
employment.179 
Moreover, like pensions, disability income, and military retirement 
pay, Combat-Related Special Compensation is a monetary asset. This is 
critical, as the Third Circuit seems to treat most monetary assets similarly. 
This is because not entitling spouses to at least a portion of each other’s 
respective money would contradict the purpose underlying equitable 
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distribution, ensuring a fair division of property. Therefore, the Third 
Circuit has repeatedly treated all monetary assets equivalently to remain 
consistent with the purposes of equitable distribution. 
The second argument in support of Combat-Related Special 
Compensation being accepted as a marital asset is the nature of 
contribution that a non-military spouse provides a military spouse. On the 
contribution factor, the analysis turns upon whether one finds a broader or 
narrow approach more appropriate. In accepting Combat-Related Special 
Compensation, courts would use a broad approach to non-economic 
contribution. Precisely, these courts would place the primary focus on a 
non-military spouse’s contribution to a military spouse’s career rather than 
the non-military spouse’s contribution to the actual asset, Combat-Related 
Special Compensation, in dispute. 
In using a broader approach, the question before the court is does a 
non-military spouse contribute to a military spouse’s military career? The 
question at issue requires courts to evaluate the nature of non-economic 
contribution that a non-military spouse dedicates to a military spouses’ 
military career. In sum, the nature of the non-economic contribution that 
non-military spouse contributes to a military spouse’s military career is 
significant. For example, a non-military spouse dedicates emotional 
support to the military spouse, maintains the household, and serves as the 
primary caretaker for the children, assuming the couple has any. 
A non-military spouse dedicates a plethora of emotional support to 
his or her non-military spouse. As a military career generally entails being 
away from family for an extended period, it is almost required for a non-
military spouse to provide emotional support to his or her respective 
spouse. Let us use our Hilary and Donald Doe hypothetical to illustrate 
this emotional support. Assume that Hilary is away from his family during 
the holiday season due to combat-related military duties. Donald is likely 
calling Hilary and providing her with some emotional support, as she is 
unable to be at home with the family during the holiday season. 
Second, a non-military spouse assists the military spouse in handling 
responsibilities regarding the children. For example, let us assume that 
Hilary is deployed to Italy for a year due to combat-related military duties. 
Because of the lengthy deployment, in this instance, Donald would be 
responsible for handling the duties involving the children. For instance, 
Donald would be required to ensure that the children got to school in a 
timely fashion and give parental guidance on homework. 
Additionally, a non-military spouse assists the military spouse in 
maintaining the household. For example, if Hilary is away for military 
combat, then Donald will be responsible for ensuring that the house is 
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functioning property. In sum, it is evident that there is an abundance of 
non-economic contribution dedicated by non-military spouse. 
The third argument in support of Combat-Related Special 
Compensation being accepted as a marital asset, is the basic principle of 
fairness; an essential concept used when exercising equitable distribution. 
Because of the nature of the non-economic contribution that a non-military 
spouse dedicates to a military spouse and the nature of military 
relationships, it would be unjust to not entitle the non-military spouse to 
at least a portion of the compensation. A military career requires a non-
military spouse to travel constantly and spend long periods of time without 
being in the physical presence of his or her spouse, placing an emotional 
burden on non-military spouses. Despite this emotional burden, non-
military spouses continue to support their military spouse in every aspect 
possible and ensure that their respective spouse has a successful military 
career. 
B. REFUSING COMBAT-RELATED SPECIAL COMPENSATION AS A 
MARITAL ASSET 
The first compelling argument in support of refusing Combat-
Related Special Compensation as a marital asset is recognition of the 
differences between Combat-Related Special Compensation and the assets 
that the Third Circuit has already considered marital. Although obtaining 
Combat-Related Special Compensation centers partially on a length of 
employment.180 Those who assert that Combat-Related Special 
Compensation is similar to some of the other controversial assets ignore 
this fact, as they inaccurately rely on the length of employment as the only 
criterion. 
The second argument in support of refusing Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a marital asset is the lack of non-economic contribution 
by the non-military spouse’s contribution to the military spouse’s Combat-
Related Special Compensation itself. In refusing Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a military asset, courts would have to dismiss a broad 
approach and evaluate the nature of non-economic contribution much 
more narrowly. In doing so, the nature of non-economic contribution 
would be minimal, as the non-military spouse does not directly fight in 
combat or serve for the military spouse. 
The third and final argument in support of refusing Combat-Related 
Special Compensation as a marital asset is the principle of fundamental 
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fairness. If the court wanted to reject Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a marital asset, it would need to construe the principle of 
fundamental fairness in favor of the military spouse. Therefore, the 
argument is that it is fundamentally unfair to award a non-military spouse 
for all the physical stress that accompanies the military spouse as a result 
of engaging in combat. 
 
VI. A Proposed Solution for the Third Circuit 
Although there are compelling arguments both for accepting and 
refusing Combat-Related Special Compensation as a marital asset, the 
majority of the precedent from Third Circuit jurisdictions supports the idea 
of holding Combat-Related Special Compensation as a marital asset in the 
equitable distribution context. 
Beginning with the nature of Combat-Related Special Compensation 
in comparison to other marital assets within the marital assets, the 
similarities drastically outweigh the differences. Combat-Related Special 
Compensation is a monetary asset that derives from the length of 
employment like pensions, disability income, and military retirement pay. 
Although, the requirements to acquire Combat-Related Special 
Compensation might be slightly more extensive than the three other assets, 
that alone has never been enough for the Third Circuit to treat two assets 
differently. In Kruger, the Supreme Court of New Jersey supported this 
proposition. Further, the Kruger courter-rejected the argument that 
military retirement pay should not be treated analogously to pensions 
merely because the requirements to acquire military retirement pay are 
more enhanced than those needed to acquire a pension. The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey instead held that the two assets both resting at least 
partially on the length of employment was enough to treat the two 
similarly. As a result, the arguments accepting Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a marital asset due to its similarities to other marital 
assets are more consistent with precedent, therefore more compelling than 
any opposition. 
Additionally, the non-economic contribution that a non-military 
spouse provides to a military spouse’s military career supports Combat-
Related Special Compensation being accepted as a marital asset. While 
scholars in favor of rejecting Combat-Related Compensation as a marital 
asset will assert that a narrower approach to evaluating non-economic 
contribution should be accepted, this approach must be rejected because it 
is completely inconsistent with fundamental fairness, the primary 
principle underlying the Third Circuit’s equitable distribution analysis. A 
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narrow approach would require the courts to overlook a non-military 
spouse’s contribution to the military spouse’s military career. This would 
be completely unfair as a military spouse is unable to have a successful 
enough career to achieve eligibility for Combat-Related Special 
Compensation, if injured, without the support from his or her spouse. As 
a result, a broader approach is more consistent with the Third Circuit’s 
precedent. Therefore, supporting the proposition that Combat-Related 
Special Compensation should be accepted as a marital asset. 
In sum, it is proper for all the equitable distribution states in the Third 
Circuit, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey, to adopt a rule 
consistent with such. The Third Circuit, however, should not award a non-
military spouse who is acting in bad-faith when asserting marital rights to 
a military spouse’s Combat-Related Special Compensation. Therefore, 
each Third Circuit equitable distribution jurisdiction should adopt a 
holding that Combat-Related Special Compensation is a marital asset in 
all instances. The exception to this rule should be when the military spouse 
demonstrate that the non-military spouse has not dedicated any non-
economic contribution to his or her military career.  This will enable courts 
to prevent non-military spouses from acting in bad-faith. Specifically, it 
prevents a non-military spouse from asserting a right to an asset when he 
or she did not contribute to the military spouse’s military career.  It would 
then be up to the court to determine whether the military spouse has met 
his or her burden. 
 
VII: Conclusion 
As we have seen, Third Circuit jurisdictions are very liberal in 
deciding which assets should be considered marital assets in the equitable 
distribution context. A decision to deem Combat-Related Special 
Compensation as a marital asset will likely not lead to the Third Circuit 
disregarding its liberal precedent. This decision, however, would likely 
create some uproar in military communities.  A decision to deem Combat-
Related Special Compensation as a martial asset would likely result in 
dissatisfaction with the law amongst the military community because of 
the personalized nature of military assets such as Combat-Related Special 
Compensation.  Military individuals tend to take extensive pride in their 
military achievements and assets because of all the labor and dedication 
needed to have a successful military career; therefore, military spouses are 
likely to reluctant to share a military asset with his or her spouse. 
Although much respect and honor should be given to military 
spouses, a rule contrary to the one proposed in this Comment would be 
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inconsistent with Third Circuit Precedent. If the Third Circuit adopts this 
rule, it would illustrate how serious the Third Circuit is in remaining 
consistent with the principles underlying equitable distribution. As this is 
what the Third Circuit has traditionally done, it should accept Combat-
Related Special Compensation as a marital asset in the equitable 
distribution context. 
